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advised to avoid normative statements on accounting policy, but to deny this mission would be akin to a medical
school that has no interest in healing patients. This paper ventures into ﬁnancial accountingwhich plays such a crit-
ical role in the functioning of capital markets and resource allocation. We provide some recommendations but,
more importantly, we provide a framework for researchers to grapple with the issue of what is “good accounting.”
The question of what is “good accounting” absorbs the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the US. They struggle with the complexity of writ-
ing accounting standards with real dedication, but ﬁnd themselves continually rewriting past standards – on
revenue recognition, leases, pensions, oﬀ-balance sheet vehicles, restructurings, to name a few – or withdraw-
ing from proposals – on fair value accounting for mortgages, for example. Some of this comes from dealing
with complexity and adapting to changing conditions, and some from working in a political environment. But
at the heart of the problem is the lack of an agreed-upon framework to guide standard setting and provide the
cohesion and consistency that avoids a scatter approach.
The two boards appear to share this concern and have embarked upon a fresh conceptual framework pro-
ject. Their endeavor starts with objectives and concepts. They then specify recognition and measurement prin-
ciples that follow from these notions. “Recognition” determines what goes into ﬁnancial statements and
“measurement” dictates how they are measured. The sequencing of ideas appears to go as follows:1 Th
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Recognition and Measurement PrinciplesHowever, the project appears to be getting little traction.1 Our guess is that the Boards’ approach will not
be successful, though we wish them well. The underlying concepts of “relevance,” “neutrality,” “faithful rep-
resentation,” and “comparability” that they propose are admirable and hardly ones to disagree with. But
these concepts are too broad to cut through to a solution on a particular accounting issue and do not connect
in any concrete way to what users look for in ﬁnancial reports. In the Recognitions stage, they state deﬁni-
tions of assets and liabilities to which future accounting must conform. This promotes a legalistic approach
that ties accounting to those deﬁnitions, rather than to the users’ needs, while entrapping preparers in a cob-
web of accounting minutiae over interpretation of deﬁnitions. Complexity becomes the dominating charac-
teristic. Anchoring accounting to a Hicksian deﬁnition of income and a “balance sheet approach” (as
tentatively proposed by the Boards) has little resonance with analysts.2
This paper takes a utilitarian approach: we examine accounting policy from the perspective of a user, spe-
ciﬁcally the fundamental analyst who uses ﬁnancial statements to value ﬁrms. “Fundamental analysis”
involves assessing ﬁrm value from an understanding of business fundamentals, but those fundamentals are
often observed through accounting numbers like sales, proﬁt margins, balance sheet debt, and so on. Indeed,
fundamental analysis is sometimes viewed as the processing of accounting information. What accounting
helps the fundamentalist and what accounting frustrates her? Is it fair value accounting? Historical cost
accounting? Rather than appealing to accounting concepts such as a “balance sheet approach,” or specifying
“fair value” or “historical cost” as an (in)appropriate “measurement attribute,” we ask: what does the funda-
mental investor need? In so doing, we take the view that ﬁnancial statements are a product and thus the
accounting problem is one of product design, tailored to the customer: what does the customer need?3e two Boards released an exposure draft for the ﬁrst stage of the project in May, 2008, covering the objectives of ﬁnancial reporting
alitative characteristics to govern accounting standards. They completed this stage in September 2010 and have since published
als on Elements and Recognition and the Reporting Entity Concept. Currently, the Boards are conducting discussions on
rement. See www.ifrs.org and www.fasb.org on the Conceptual Framework pages.
ore detailed commentary on the initial stages of the Conceptual Framework project is in “A Framework for Financial Accounting
rds: Issues and a Suggested Framework,” Accounting Horizons 24 (September 2010), 471–485, by the American Accounting
ation Financial Accounting Standards Committee (James Ohlson and Stephen Penman, principal authors).
is product design perspective is outlined in Penman, S. “Eye on the Prize: Directions for Accounting Research,” China Accounting
, vol. 6, no. 4 (December 2008), 465–476.
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We ﬁrmly embrace that objective of the Boards to provide information “about the amount, timing and uncer-
tainty of future cash ﬂows” to equity investors and “how those cash ﬂows aﬀect the prices of their equity inter-
ests.” But, again, we ﬁnd this too broad, lacking direction as to the speciﬁc accounting that satisﬁes the
objective. One needs to cut to the quick: what is the accounting that the user requires to forecast cash ﬂows?
The answer to this question might be solicited by going to investors and analysts directly and posing the
question. Indeed, the accounting Boards have been very keen to get the opinions of analysts. It appears, how-
ever, that this approach does not elicit clear recommendations. For example, the leadership of the CFA Insti-
tute has come out strongly in favor of fair value accounting, while their rank-and-ﬁle working analysts seem to
have a diﬀerent opinion. The Boards’ recent insurance proposals have been controversial among analysts, with
some endorsement (largely in Europe) and some strong opposition (largely in the US). We suspect the reason
is that analysts use accounting data in very diﬀerent ways; there is no common platform for carrying out
analysis.
We take a diﬀerent approach. First, we show how accounting numbers connect to valuation, providing a
starting point from which to examine accounting issues from an investor’s point of view. This is done, in Sec-
tion 2, by stating two formal relations, one that connects accounting numbers to price and one that connects
accounting numbers to stock returns. These relations come from accounting research, a statement of what
research to date has put on the table. So, they also serve as a point of departure for our suggestions for future
research at the end of the paper. But, these formal expressions go only so far in directing the actual form that
accounting should take. So, in Section 3, we articulate the demands of the fundamental analyst, the consumer
of ﬁnancial reports. This is done by stating a set of principles of “good practice” for fundamental analysis that
conveys the type of information that the analyst desires. Finally, in Section 4, we overlay these “good practice”
principles on the framework in Section 2 to reach conclusions about the form of “good accounting” that sup-
ports “good practice.” The following summarizes how we move from the valuation equations in Section 2 via
the principles of fundamental analysis in Section 3 to the accounting principles in Section 4.Valuation Principles
#
Analysis Principles
#
Accounting PrinciplesWhile the formal modeling in Section 2 is established in past research, the most conditional part of our
analysis – to which the reader may take exception – is the statement of “good practice” principles in Section 3.
All policy research must start with normative statements and we choose to make normative statements about
practice to resolve accounting issues. These principles of good practice are not of our choosing, but rather
gleaned from writings on fundamental analysts over many years. They are principles which an analyst can
hardly disagree with; indeed, we believe they are commonly accepted. However, the acceptance of our frame-
work largely rests on the reader’s appreciation that these principles make good sense for practice against alter-
natives that may be oﬀered. The principles stand in contrast to the IASB and FASB approach: rather than
specifying desirable “qualitative characteristics” of information a priori, we infer those characteristics from
the demand by users. In contrast to the Boards’ concepts, our principles cut to the quick, producing immediate
accounting recommendations. One critical issue of accounting policy is the contentious choice of a “balance
sheet approach” versus an “income statement approach.” This is resolved within our framework.
We hasten to state that the focus on the equity analyst (and the equity investor) is not the only relevant
perspective; there are other users of ﬁnancial statements, and indeed, the Boards see their task as accounting
for all investors. Indeed, the Boards take an “entity perspective” in their conceptual framework, while we take
a “proprietorship perspective” where the focus is on accounting to shareholders, the owners. Our analysis is
not necessarily deﬁnitive, just one that we are able to put on the table – to be evaluated against alternatives
that others may oﬀer. When available, we bring the results of research to the issue but, regrettably, research is
short on answering normative questions. The gap in relevant research points to research questions, underscor-
ing a secondary goal of the paper: to provide direction to research on accounting policy issues.
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A primary objective in the IASB and FASB conceptual framework documents is to provide information
about future cash ﬂows. But, the stated objective does not point to how this is to be done: balance sheets,
income statements and their details are presumably important, but how do these ﬁnancial statements connect
to future cash ﬂows and to value? This section lays out models that sharpen up the idea. The models come
directly from research. The ﬁrst is the standard residual income model that connects accounting numbers
to equity value. The second is an expression that connects stock returns to accounting numbers.
2.1. Connecting accounting numbers to equity value
When it comes to equity investing, the cash ﬂows that the Boards wish to forecast are dividends – the cash
ﬂows to shareholders. The standard dividend discount model expresses the idea:4 Th
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ð1þ rÞ3 þ . . . . . . ð1Þwhere r is the discount rate (the required return for risk borne) and the ellipsis points indicate that, for a going
concern like a business, the forecasts continue indeﬁnitely into the future. (Variables subscripted t > 0 are ex-
pected values here and in what follows.) There is no controversy about this model: it embeds the principle on
which sound valuation must be based.4
The key is to connect accounting numbers to expected dividends and thus to value. Accounting, in fact,
imbeds an operation that precisely does this, in the form of the clean surplus relation that governs the artic-
ulation of the income statement and balance sheet: Book Valuet = Book Valuet1 + Earningst  Net Dividendst
or, in more operational terms, earnings for a period are closed to book value and dividends are paid out of
book value.5 Accordingly, Net Dividendst = Earningst  (Book Valuet  Book Valuet1) so, substituting into
the dividend discount model and iterating over future periods,Value0 ¼ B0 þ Earnings1  r  B0
1þ r þ
Earnings2  r  B1
ð1þ rÞ2 þ
Earnings3  r  B2
ð1þ rÞ3 þ       ð2Þwhere B is book value and Earningst – rBt1 is referred to as residual income. The equivalence of model (2)
with model (1) says that one recognizes that there is value on the balance sheet (in the book value) and then
utilizes information that forecasts future earnings. If those forecasted earnings cover the required return ap-
plied to book value, one adds value to the balance sheet. Book value is value that has already been recorded
(on the balance sheet), while the remainder is value that has not yet been recorded on the balance sheet – it is
value that is expected to be booked to the balance sheet in the future.6
It is remarkable that accounting, in the form it has been practiced for centuries, ties so elegantly to value.
Further, with only a mild additional condition (that is also honored in accounting as practiced) – dividends aree model is attributed to John Burr Williams, The Theory of Investment Value (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938),
the idea of present value as a measure of wealth is due to Irving Fisher earlier. The model is essentially a statement of the no-
ge idea: present value must bear a no-arbitrage relationship to expected future cash ﬂows, such that value must be the price at which
pects to earn the required return for the risk assumed, no more, no less.
e earnings must be comprehensive earnings, so the clean surplus relation is not strictly applied under IFRS or GAAP because “other
ehensive income” is booked directly to equity book value, bypassing the income statement.
e residual earnings model has had a long history. In the early part of the 20th century, the idea that a ﬁrm’s value was based on
s proﬁts” was ﬁrmly established in the United Kingdom. The model is in the German literature of the 1920s and 1930s, particularly
writings of Schmalenbach. In the US, Gabriel Preinreich, an accounting and valuation theorist associated with Columbia University
1930s and 1940s, wrote extensively on the model, including “The Fair Value and Yield of Common Stock,” The Accounting Review
, 130–140 and “Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Depreciation,” Econometrica 6 (1938), 219–41. In a 1941 paper,
eich recognizes the model in a prize essay by a student, J. H. Bourne in Accountant, London, 22 September 1888, pp. 605–606 (as
ced by Prenireich). Some relatively recent expositions of the residual earnings model are in E. Edwards and P. Bell, The Theory and
rement of Business Income (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 48–54 and 66–69, Ken Peasnell, “Some Formal
ctions Between Economic Values and Yields and Accounting Numbers,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting (1982), 361–
he residual income model has been brought to the fore in modern academic research by James Ohlson, “Earnings, Book Values, and
nds in Equity Valuation,” Contemporary Accounting Research 12 (1995), 661–687.
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the Miller and Modigliani principle of dividend irrelevance, so foundational to modern ﬁnance.7
However, with a view to establishing accounting principles, it is important to recognize that only one
accounting principle is involved in model (2), the clean surplus relation. So, at this point, only one normative
statement can be made: accounting should clearly report comprehensive income, for the equivalence of the
model with the dividend discount model only holds if earnings are comprehensive.8 In all other respects,
the model is mute on the accounting. Indeed, the model holds for random accounting numbers! Clearly, some-
thing else has to be brought to the table, and that we do in the next section of the paper. But one point is clear:
the expression divides value between book value (already booked to the balance sheet) and value expected to
be booked in the future. Dividends aside, book value is increased by earnings, by the clean-surplus relation, so
it is a question of the timing of earnings recognition. That, of course, just reinforces the point that accrual
accounting is a question of allocation of earnings to periods.
To make the point in the extreme, one can always apply an accounting whereby all expectations of the
future are booked to book value such that7 See
687 wh
8 Mo
income
and G
9 See
windowValue0 ¼ Book Value0 ð2aÞ
(and expected residual income is zero). That, of course, is a form of fair value accounting. Is that the account-
ing that the fundamental analyst requires? The answer resolves around the question: how much anticipation of
the future should be brought into the ﬁnancial statements? This is the critical “recognition” question in
accounting. It recasts the question in the Recognition stage of the IASB and FASB conceptual framework
project. It is the question to which we return in Section 4.2.2. Connecting accounting numbers to stock returns
Via the same clean-surplus relation, accounting connects to stock returns. Substitutingdt ¼ Earningst  ðBt  Bt1Þ into the stock return; P t þ dt  P t1;
Stock returnt ¼ Earningst þ ðP t  BtÞ  ðP t1  Bt1Þ ð3ÞThis expression says that the stock return is always equal to earnings for the period plus the change in the
premium over book value (price minus book value). If there is no change in premium, then the stock returns is
equal to earnings. The expression ﬁrst appears in Easton, Harris and Ohlson (1992),9 but textbooks of old
used to state it in terms of the canceling error property of accounting: accounting may have error in the bal-
ance sheet (by carrying book value diﬀerent from price), but earnings supply all the information for stock
returns if the error is the same at the end of the period as at the beginning (that is, the errors cancel). Alter-
natively stated, earnings are suﬃcient for stock returns under this condition. Accordingly, accounting can tol-
erate error in the balance sheet, up to a constant, and still be perfectly informative; accounting that aims at a
balance sheet that is suﬃcient for value, as in model (2a) is not necessary. We take this insight to the issue of
accounting principles in Section 4.
The IASB and FASB objective is to provide information about the amount and uncertainty of future cash
ﬂows. Value is the present value of forecasted cash ﬂows, discounted for uncertainty, so another possible
dimension of accounting is to provide information about the discount rate. Couched in terms on the account-
ing valuation in model (2), the discount rate, r, is that which discounts expected residual income.
The discount rate is also called the cost of capital or the expected return for risk borne. Expression (3) can
also be stated in terms of expected returns by rolling 1 year forward:James Ohlson, “Earnings, Book Values, and Dividends in Equity Valuation,” Contemporary Accounting Research 12 (1995), 661–
ich is a foundational paper that recognizes that accounting imbeds the same foundational propositions of modern ﬁnance.
re strictly, the equivalence holds only if expected future earnings are comprehensive. So, to the extent that “other comprehensive
” has components with mean zero expectation (like unrealized gains and losses and currency gains and losses), the current IFRS
AAP treatment of bypassing the income statement with other comprehensive income is of no consequence.
Easton, P., T. Harris and J. Ohlson, “Aggregate accounting earnings can explain most of security returns: The case of long event
s,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 15 (1992), 119–142.
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Dividing through by Pt to yield the expected rate-of-return,E
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ð4ÞWhile expression (3) gives insights into balance sheet versus income statement measurement, expression (4)
gives insights into how accounting might provide information about the discount rate, as we will see.
However, while these expressions connect accounting to prices, returns and expected returns, they are mute
on the form of the accounting. Something else needs to be brought to the issue. With a focus on the user, we
do this by stating a number of principles of practice.3. Fundamentalist principles of practice
The IASB and FASB conceptual framework starts with principles (like “relevance,” “faithful representa-
tion,” and “neutrality”) that deﬁne the characteristics of information to be supplied. We too start with prin-
ciples that characterize the information, but they are principles that have to do with the demand for
information. They are normative, albeit gleaned from practice. Normative statements are, of course, unavoid-
able: any normative analysis must start with normative statements.
The standard mantra of the fundamentalist is: price is what you pay, value is what you get. In contrast to
those who see prices as an “eﬃcient” measure of fair value, the fundamentalist sees price as speculative and
potentially diﬀerent from value. So she carries out an analysis of the fundamentals to challenge the market
price. In doing so, she adheres to three principles:
1. Understand what you know and separate what you know from speculation.
2. Anchor a valuation on what you know rather than speculation.
3. When valuing a ﬁrm to challenge the price, do not put price in the calculation.
These principles are gleaned from the writings of fundamental investors over many years, particularly Benja-
min Graham.10 Graham spoke of “value justiﬁed by the facts” and “minimum true value” versus “speculative
value.”11 The principles are simply “common sense,” distilled from human experience in coping with
uncertainty.
The ﬁrst two principles give more speciﬁcity to the relevance and reliability concept that appear so often in
concept documents of the FASB. These concepts are often presented as tradeoﬀs: to get relevance, one gives
up reliability (and that is said to be OK). But the fundamentalist says not to mix speculative information (that
may be relevant) with reliable information, for it is reliable information to which she anchors to challenge
speculative stock prices. The fundamentalist understands that prices are speculative and wants reliable
accounting reports for anchoring a valuation. The fundamentalist implicitly says to the accountant: do not
mix the two; tell me what you know, but leave the speculation to me. Otherwise, I lose an anchorage. Benja-
min Graham decomposed value as follows:Value ¼ Minimum true valueþ Speculative value
With a little license (with accounting in mind) this might be restated as:aham’s treatise, The Intelligent Investor, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1973) outlines many of the ideas. The ﬁrst edition
blished in 1949, and a reprint in 2005 with a preface by Warren E. Buﬀett. His other classic, with considerably more on technique, is
in Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security Analysis: Principles and Technique 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill
ompany, Inc., 1962). The ﬁrst edition, authored by Graham and Dodd, was published in 1934. A later incarnation is Sidney Cottle,
Murray, and Frank Block, Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis, 5th ed. (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988). A more
book that follows the same principles is Bruce C. N. Greenwald, Judd Kahn, Paul D. Sonkin, and Michael van Biema, Value
ng: From Graham to Buﬀett and Beyond (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001).
Graham, B., “The Future of Financial Analysis,” Financial Analysts Journal 16 (May–June 1963), 65–70 where he warns to
te “minimum true value” from speculative value. In “A Conversation with Benjamin Graham” in the Financial Analysts Journal
mber–October 1976), pp. 20–23, Graham also distinguishes “investment characteristics” from “speculative characteristics” of stocks.
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The accountant supplies information for the ﬁrst component in the ﬁnancial statements but does not con-
taminate that anchoring information with speculative information. Anchoring information might include cur-
rent sales but not speculation about future sales (in a “fair value” discounted cash ﬂow number, for example).
Of course, information for speculation is also relevant and nothing here restricts disclosure of such below the
line (in footnotes).
The anchoring idea and the need to supply accounting that challenges speculative stock prices is behind
many of the accounting prescriptions later in this paper. With the stock market in China so volatile – some
claim it is not well aligned with fundamentals – we hope that these ideas are appealing. The third fundamen-
talist principle is pertinent: if one is to challenge price with a value, then price cannot be part of the calculation
of value. This, of course, bears directly on mark-to-market accounting that includes market prices in ﬁnancial
statements.4. Accounting principles for the fundamental analyst
Our analysis has the same end goal as the IASB and FASB conceptual framework: to establish recognition
and measurement principles for the balance sheet and income statement. The burning issue of fair value
accounting versus historical cost accounting is, of course, involved, but so are many other issues. For the bal-
ance sheet, the Boards have oﬀered a set of deﬁnitions of assets and liabilities that govern recognition, with the
measurement phase still in discussion.
Expressions (2)–(4) provide our starting point but, as said earlier, they do not take us far enough. While
they state how an analyst connects accounting information to value and the discount rate, they are mute
on the form of that accounting. Adding the principles of the last section carries us to conclusions about
accounting. The accounting principles we state here are broad principles that are not detailed for every
accounting issue that could arise. But we believe that the principles are operational enough such that the treat-
ment of a speciﬁc issue can be inferred with little ambiguity.4.1. Balance sheet approach versus income statement approach
For the valuation expression in Eq. (2), the clean surplus accounting relation connects accrual accounting
numbers to cash ﬂows. It is not just an equation, it is an actual accounting operation: start with the balance
sheet, calculate earnings for the period, close earnings to book value (via the closing entry) and pay dividends
out of book value. This, of course, is the accounting cycle taught in every beginning accounting class and (lar-
gely) applied in IFRS and GAAP.
The ﬁrst issue that arises for a system of articulated income statements and balance sheets is whether to
emphasize the balance sheet or the income statement, and the IASB and FASB rightly confront this issue.
The “balance sheet approach,” which appears to be favored in the Boards’ conceptual framework discussions,
focuses on measurement in the balance sheet, with the income statement being the residual; as, under clean
surplus accounting, the income statement is just the change in the balance sheet (adjusted for net dividends),
the income statement “falls out” as the diﬀerence between successive balance sheets. The Board has supported
this notion by an appeal to one version of Hick’s deﬁnition of income: income is the amount of wealth that a
man can consume in a period and leave himself as well oﬀ at the end as at the beginning. Accordingly, the
focus is on measuring wealth at the beginning and end of the period (in the balance sheet). In contrast, the
“income statement approach,” focuses on measurement of earnings for the period, with the balance sheet fall-
ing out as a transition between income statements, that is, for carrying balances that are not involved in
income measurement. Put another way, the balance sheet approach focuses on the measurement of assets
and liabilities (with equity the diﬀerence between the two), while the income statement approach focuses on
revenues from trading with customers and the earnings derived there from after “matching” expenses incurred
to generate the revenue.
For example, a balance sheet approach carries inventory at its fair value (what it is worth), whereas an
income statement approach carries it on the balance sheet as cost that is not yet matched to revenue from
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customers, but a cost that is recognized (as cost of goods sold) only upon a transaction with a customer; the
cost is subtracted from sales to calculate value added from trading with customers. Accordingly, inventory
cost is carried on the balance sheet until a sale is made. An income statement approach might recognize a
deferred credit (liability) to eﬀect matching of expenses to revenues in the income measurement, whereas
the balance sheet approach would not see this as part of the balance sheet because it does not ﬁt the deﬁnition
of a “true” liability. The inventory example pertains to measurement, the deferred credit example to
recognition.
Expression (3) in Section 2 provides insight into the issue of a balance sheet approach versus an income
statement approach. Underlying the balance sheet approach is the idea that accounting is in error if the bal-
ance sheet does not convey the value of assets and liabilities. This idea is presumably behind the common
claim that we need current values in the balance sheet and historical cost is “backward looking.” But the
returns–earnings expression (3) says that this is not necessarily correct. Accounting can tolerate error in the
balance (P  B diﬀerent from zero): provided the error in the balance sheet is unchanged over the period, earn-
ings are suﬃcient to imply stock returns. And, as value is expected stock returns (equal to expected earnings)
capitalized, earnings are suﬃcient to infer value (and wealth); one can value from stocks of value (the balance
sheet) but also from ﬂows (earnings). In short, a balance sheet approach is not necessary because there is also
an income statement. Of course, there is an issue when the premium changes.
The point is pertinent to the claim that the balance sheet is deﬁcient if intangible assets are omitted. That is
not the case: if an intangible asset (like a brand) is missing from the balance sheet, there is no issue if the earn-
ings from the missing asset are coming through the income statement.12 The point is also pertinent to the cap-
italization or expensing of R&D, or any investment in an intangible asset like human resources, brands,
customer relationships, and supply chains. Expression (3) recognizes the canceling error property of account-
ing: it does not matter if one capitalizes and amortizes the expenditure or expenses it immediately if there is no
change in the balance sheet error. That point is taught in ﬁrst accounting class where the student is told that
earnings are the same irrespective of whether R&D is capitalized and amortized or expensed immediately pro-
vided there in no growth in R&D expenditure (for growth induces a change in the premium, P  B).
The recognition of value of assets on the balance sheet, by putting brands on the balance sheet or by apply-
ing fair value accounting more generally, can add error that does not cancel but actually compounds. Estimat-
ing the value of a brand (for Coca-Cola Company, say) is subject to considerable error, thus putting a “ﬂuﬀy”
number on the balance sheet. But that error goes through to the income statement, because the income state-
ment is just the diﬀerence in successive balance sheets. Indeed, the error is compounded, for the error in the
income statement is aﬀected by the balance sheet error at both the beginning and end of the period.13 If one
has a fuzzy balance sheet, it is less informative, but if one also loses the information in earnings, the loss is
more general: such accounting could produce an uninformative balance sheet and also a less informative
income statement. Coca-Cola is in fact relatively easy to value based on its historical cost earnings, a valuation
that would be made more diﬃcult under a balance sheet approach.
In sum, the discussion stresses that an income statement approach (with a focus on earnings measurement)
is not only an alternative to a value approach in the balance sheet but also provides the correction to an imper-
fect balance sheet. Given that a perfect balance sheet is hard to achieve – value is hard to measure – this is an
important point. And the discussion highlights that an attempt to provide a value balance sheet (that inevi-
tably has measurement error) can actually destroy the earnings that compensate for error in the balance sheet.
However, it does not have much to say about the measurement principles for the balance sheet and income
statement. For that, we invoke the fundamentalist principles.1412 This point is elaborated upon in Penman, S. “Accounting for Intangible Assets: There is Also an Income Statement,” Abacus, vol. 45,
no. 3 (September 2009), 359–371.
13 This eﬀect is demonstrated formally in Peasnell, K, ‘Institution-speciﬁc Value’, BIS Working Paper No. 210, August 2006.
14 Many of the principles below are also found in “A Framework for Financial Accounting Standards: Issues and a Suggested
Framework,” Accounting Horizons 24 (September 2010), 471–485, by the American Accounting Association Financial Accounting
Standards Committee (James Ohlson and Stephen Penman, principal authors). The framework for arriving at these principles diﬀers,
however, and is more akin to that in Penman, S., Accounting for Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
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Expression (2) directs the analyst how to handle the balance sheet and income statement in valuation: start
with the balance sheet, then add value to the balance sheet if earnings forecasts are in excess of those from the
required return applied to book value. Or, in diﬀerent words, anchor on the book value and then add spec-
ulation about future earnings.
The separation of the balance sheet, observed in the present (now), from speculative forecasts of the future
is akin to the fundamentalists’ separation of what we know from speculation. With the principle of anchoring
on “what you know” rather than speculation, one can restate the division of value in Section 3 as follows:15 Th
Accoun
one-fo
held as
movem
customValue ¼ Anchoring balance sheet valueþ Value from speculative earnings forecasts
Fundamentalist principles require that the anchoring balance sheet be non-speculative. Thus, the principle
for measurement in the balance sheet is stated as follows:
The balance sheet principle: The balance sheet rests on facts observed in current and past transactions and
eschews speculation about future transactions.
The deﬁning measurement comes from transactions where “transactions” refer to actual, veriﬁable events
which the ﬁrm is drawn into, those that establish and change a ﬁrm’s property rights and contractual obliga-
tions. Transactions stand in contrast to estimated future events that can be “relevant” but are speculative. In
addition, transactions must be of “arms-length” and thus cut across self-dealing.
The reader can see that we are endorsing historical cost accounting versus accounting based on fair value
estimates of the future, though better terminology might be “historical transaction accounting.” Speciﬁcally
excluded from the balance sheet are estimates of future transactions, for they are subjective – they are spec-
ulation. To the extent that estimates are used (for bad debt provisions, warranty liabilities, and the like), they
are based on the evidential history of a ﬁrm’s experience with transactions (of actual bad debts and warranty
claims), not conjecture.
In more colloquial terms, the balance sheet that anchors the valuation must be “hard.” “Soft,” speculative
intangible assets are not booked to the balance sheet. By “hard,” we mean that the investor is assured that
balance sheet accounting cannot come back to hit her later. Shunting liabilities oﬀ-balance sheet, with reper-
cussions to follow, does not suit her. “Soft,” speculative intangible assets are not booked to the balance sheet
for those intangible assets are speculative, subject to future outcomes; they can come back to hit the investor if
the asset value is not realized. Fair values put risk into the balance sheet – the value is an expected value that
may not be realized – and thus are typically excluded.15
Conservative accounting broadly applies. When in doubt about carrying values, assets are impaired such
that the balance sheet measure is not above estimated value. With revenues booked only from current trans-
actions (and not expected future transactions), price-to-book ratios are thus expected to be above one, with
the analyst adding value from speculative forecasts of future residual earnings.4.3. Recognition and measurement in the income statement
With an anchoring to a hard balance sheet, speculation is added by the analyst to arrive at a value under the
framework of Eq. (2). The income statement is the anchor for those forecasts. The anchoring principle for the
income statement is:
The income statement principle: The income statement provides a forecast of what future income will be if
current conditions prevail.e exception of the one-to-one principle is recognized in Nissim, D. and S. Penman, Principles for the Application of Fair Value
ting, Center for Excellence in Accounting and Security Analysis, Columbia Business School, White Paper No. 2, August 2007. The
r-one principle refers to shareholder wealth moving one-to-one with market prices (in a liquid market), as with the price of a bond
an investment. The principle typically holds for ﬁnancing assets, but not for operations where value is added, not from market price
ents, but from a business model that arbitrages input and output prices (costs and revenues) to make a proﬁt, that is, trading with
ers and suppliers.
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current income he or she adds speculation that conditions may be diﬀerent in the future but, in absence of
a forecasted change in conditions, future income will equal current income.
There are two aspects. First, revenues are based on actual trading with customers, not expectations of
future revenues. Past sales are typically an indication of the ability to generate future sales, but specula-
tion about future sales is left to the analyst.16 Second, expenses are matched to revenues to calculate a
measure of value added from sales (operating income) that informs about the proﬁtability of sales under
current conditions. Thus, if the analyst forecasts no sales growth in the near term, current operating
income is a good indicator of future income. And, if the analyst forecasts sales will be diﬀerent, a reliable
income forecast is made by applying the current proﬁt margin to those sales (after excluding one-time
items that are clearly indicated). The analyst might use other information (besides accounting information)
to forecast a change in the proﬁt margin, but a forecast of a change in proﬁt margin should not be
aﬀected by how the accountant currently calculates it; there should be no earnings reversals in the future
simply because of the way the accounting is done. While conservatism in the balance sheet is desired (see
above), excessive conservatism (that writes down assets too much and reverses the write down to the
income statement in the future) is inconsistent with this principle. And so with “cookie jar” accounting
that shifts income between periods. In short, accounting that lends itself to earnings management violates
the principle.4.4. The deferral principle and risk
In their objectives statement, the IASB and FASB aim to provide information about the amount and uncer-
tainty of future cash ﬂows. Imbedded in the balance sheet and income statement principles stated above is the
following principle:
The deferral principle: Under uncertainty, earnings recognition is deferred until the uncertainty has been
resolved.
With accounting based on transactions, earnings recognition is transaction-based, largely driven by revenue
recognition via actual sales. While the analyst may speculate about future earnings and sales, and while prices
may be based on expectations of future earnings, transaction-based accounting is conservative: earnings are
not booked until the ﬁrm has a customer, that is, until the uncertainty surrounding the expected earnings
is resolved with a transaction.
This principle ties accounting to risk. But, it also ties accounting to the expected return, the discount rate,
by Eq. (4). If there is no expected change in the premium (P  B), then the expected return is equal to the
expected earnings yield, as under the eﬀective interest method for bonds with no change in interest rates.
But, with an expected change in the premium, the expected return equals the expected earnings yield plus
the price-denominated expected change in the premium. But, it is the deferral of the earnings that induces
a change in the premium.17
In sum, the transactions accounting implied by the fundamentalist principles of Section 3 produce account-
ing that is revealing of risk and the required return for risk: a ﬁrm with considerable earnings expectations
built into its stock price, but earnings that have not yet been booked by transactions accounting is risky.
Empirical evidence suggests that this is so.18 In contrast, fair value accounting puts risk into the balance sheet
and thus this feature is lost. The fair value balance sheet, rather than being an anchorage for speculation about
the future and its risk, becomes the embodiment of those risks.16 For a proposal for revenue recognition that is consistent with the principles in this paper, see “Accounting for Revenues: A Framework
for Standard Setting,” Accounting Horizons 25 (2011), 577–592 by the American Accounting Association Financial Accounting Standards
Committee (James Ohlson and Stephen Penman, principal authors).
17 This is demonstrated in Penman, S., F. Reggiani, S. Richardson and _I. Tuna, “A Characteristic Model for Asset Pricing,” unpublished
paper, Columbia University, Bocconi University, and London Business School, 2013.
18 See Penman, S. and F. Reggiani, “Returns to Buying Earnings and Book Value: Accounting for Growth and Risk,” Review of
Accounting Studies (December, 2013), forthcoming.
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This paper has presented a framework for evaluating normative accounting policy. It is rooted in expres-
sions that connect accounting numbers to valuation and in normative principles under which the fundamental
analyst works in evaluating investments. It is thus theoretically and practically based, designed to provide an
accounting product that serves the user. We do not claim that the framework and the accounting principles
that come from it to be deﬁnitive, but oﬀer them as a benchmark against which other normative frameworks
can be compared. We trust that we have been clear as to “where we are coming from,” so that the reader can
see the point at which he or she disagrees. We believe that our framework moves much quicker to accounting
solutions than does the IASB and FASB conceptual framework project while, at the same time, is much closer
to the accounting that a fundamental analyst desires.19
5.1. Implications for research
We close with some suggestions for future research in general, followed by some suggestions for future
research with China considerations particularly in mind.
First and foremost, we encourage researchers to engage in normative accounting issues and research that
gives rise to accounting solutions. That research should have its eye on the user: what accounting helps or hin-
ders the user? It is helpful to see this research as similar to a medical researcher developing a new drug. He or
she asks: what are the beneﬁts and what are the side eﬀects? This should be the approach to accounting issues.
Of course, there is considerable research already that can be characterized as investigating the product fea-
tures of accounting. Research on earnings quality falls into this category, as does the research on the ability to
manage earnings under IFRS and GAAP. We oﬀer further suggestions. Many of these will require analytical
modeling but most also lend themselves to empirical investigation.
 The ideas in this paper require more formal modeling. The revenue recognition principle is an important
topic: why would an investor want the accounting for revenue to be transactions based? Why would an
investor wish the deferral principle to be in place?
 The income statement approach works quite well with constant error in the balance sheet. But what
accounting aids the investor when this condition does not hold? Would a mixed balance sheet and income
statement approach (the “mixed model”) help?
 There is considerable need to understand the appropriate accounting for forecasting. Does the income
statement principle stated above lead to better forecasting? How does IFRS and GAAP accounting frus-
trate forecasting? Clearly, the balance sheet principle is also relevant, for much of the balance sheet becomes
future expenses.
 How should the income statement be presented to enhance forecasting? Diﬀerent income statement items
have diﬀerent implications for the future, so the forecasting perspective would suggest that items should be
grouped according to this criterion. This accords with the analyst’s desire for a measure of “sustainable
income” or “core income,” that is, income that projects the future versus “transitory income” of the
present.
 What are the eﬀects of fair value accounting in the balance sheet? In contrast to historical transactions
accounting, fair value accounting puts the risk in the future into the balance sheet. So, what are the risks
that an investor faces with a fair value balance sheet? Is risk better understood with a balance sheet based
on historical transactions accounting?
 Does fair value accounting lose information by destroying information available in historical cost earnings?
What is gained by fair value accounting?
 What are the properties and eﬀects of fair value accounting for mortgages? What are the eﬀects of the pro-
spective method versus the incurred-loss method for estimated loan losses?19 The book, Penman, S. Accounting for Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) illustrates how accounting of the type
envisioned here can be applied to active fundamental investing.
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ance sheet, for example, from leaving operating leases or pensions oﬀ the balance sheet?
 How is historical transactions accounting implemented? How does the accountant go about matching costs
to revenues in the income statement? Issues of product cost and period costs arise, as does absorption cost-
ing versus variable costing and accounting for (excess) capacity costs.
 Can the deferral principle for recognizing earnings under uncertainty be more explicit, perhaps by linking
accounting to an asset pricing model for the expected return via Eq. (4)?
 What principle determines whether research and development (or just development) should be capitalized
and amortized? How are amortization rates determined? Does the uncertainty about amortization rates
mean that R&D expenditures should be expensed immediately (with amortization left to speculation by
the analyst)? Does the deferral principle under uncertainty imply the immediate expensing of (risky)
R&D expenditures?
 From an analyst’s point of view, is the capitalization of brand-building expenditures (advertising and pro-
motion) desirable? Again, do uncertain amortization rates (that induce imprecise matching) negate
capitalization?
 How should the ﬁnancial statements be designed to enhance analysis and, particularly, forecasting? This
issue is pertinent to the IASB and FASB current project on ﬁnancial statement presentation.
5.2. Implications for accounting research in China
Accounting in China operates in a much diﬀerent environment than most developed economies. First, the
current Chinese economy has evolved under a central-planning model, a process that started a bit more than
30 years ago. The legacy of central planning still permeates the Chinese economy. Second, most large enter-
prises, although partially privatized through share listing on stock exchanges, are still controlled by the state
via majority equity ownership. The state government on one hand is the social administrator, and on the other
hand is a controlling shareholder of these enterprises. When the objective as the social administrator diﬀers
from the objective of a controlling shareholder, agency problems arise within the government itself.20 Non-
state Chinese investors, in many cases in a minority position, have to deal with this peculiar agency problem
(the within-government agency problem).
Accounting standards in China have evolved in the past 20 years out of the rigid and uniform Soviet
accounting systems into the currently practiced International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In most
ways, the current Chinese Accounting Standards are congruent to International Accounting Standards in
terms of objectives, concepts, recognition, and measurement. Accounting practice, however, may take longer
to converge to international standards.21
Even though the accounting environment diﬀers in China and oﬃcial accounting standards have caught up
with the international community only recently, we believe the role of accounting in society should not diﬀer in
any signiﬁcant way in China. That is, accounting should provide investors with information to evaluate a ﬁrm
and help investors allocate economic resources in an eﬃcient way. Thus, we believe all the research questions
that we raised earlier apply to China research. However, we also have some additional suggestions for China
accounting research.
 How does the boundary of the ﬁrm diﬀer in China with the presence of the within-government agency prob-
lem? That is, how does valuation change when the state controlling shareholder can tell the ﬁrm to conduct
businesses in a way that fulﬁlls social objectives that may harm ﬁrm value? What diﬀerent or additional20 Commentaries illustrate the problem: “Why China Works? A look at bright spots in the recession begins with Beijing, where state
control is looking smart.” NewsWeek, January 19, 2009.
21 For more details of the convergence of Chinese accounting into International Accounting Standards, see Bing Xiang, 1998,
“Institutional factors inﬂuencing China’s accounting reforms”, Accounting Horizon 12: 105–119; Charles Chen, Ferdinand Gul, and Xijia
Su, 1999, “A comparison of reported earnings under Chinese GAAP vs. IAS: Evidence from the Shanghai Stock Exchanges”, Accounting
Horizon 13: 91–111; Shimin Chen, Zheng Sun, and Yuetang Wang, 2002, “Evidence from China on whether harmonized accounting
standards harmonize accounting practices”, Accounting Horizon 16: 183–197.
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accounting – the equity focus – that is imbedded in much of our discussion above? Is an entity concept
of accounting more appropriate in China? Could accounting be brought to the issue of how value is divided
between the achievement of social goals and shareholder wealth?
 How can accounting be designed to evaluate the eﬀects of related-party transactions when the state is a
major shareholder of the reporting entity and many of its business counterparts?
 In addition to the operational uncertainty that ﬁrms in other economies also face, the within-government
agency problem creates an additional layer of uncertainty for investors evaluating a ﬁrm in China. A large
portion of the economic activity is organized through government planning, and government priorities
change frequently and are diﬃcult to predict. How can accounting and disclosure address this additional
layer of uncertainty and aid investors in forecasting? Reducing uncertainty has the beneﬁt of reducing
the cost of capital, a beneﬁt to the economy as a whole.
 China has adopted fair value accounting along with the IFRS. However, Chinese capital markets are
renowned for their volatility. A volatile market price translates into volatile earnings and balance sheet.
What are the consequences of fair value accounting in China? Is China a model of how mark-to-market
accounting works (or does not work) for the investor?
 Institutional investors account for a relatively small portion in China’s stock market and casual observa-
tions show that the stock prices are highly speculative. What accounting can anchor the large set of retail
investors better?
The two sets of suggestions for accounting research are big questions and surely have to be reﬁned to get
traction. On most of them, we do not have the answer. There is much need for further investigation such that
accounting principles are established, not from conjecture, but as a product of sound research. The result will
be concrete solutions for practice and an elevation of the status of accounting academics as having made a
“contribution.” All important is the thinking behind the research. We hope we have added to that thinking
with this paper.
